On Play and Playing by Duško Rudan
Coll. Antropol. 37 (2013) 4: 1385–1391
Review
On Play and Playing
Du{ko Rudan
University »Josip Juraj Strossmayer«, School of Medicine, PhD student, Osijek, Croatia
A B S T R A C T
The paper offers a review of the development of the concept of play and playing. The true beginnings of the develop-
ment of the theories of play are set as late as in the 19th century. It is difficult to define play as such; it may much more
easily be defined through its antipode – work. In the beginning, play used to be connected with education; it was not
before Freud’s theory of psychoanalysis and Piaget’s developmental psychology that the importance of play in a child’s
development began to be explained in more detail. The paper further tackles the role of play in the adult age. Detailed
attention is paid to psychodynamic and psychoanalytic authors, in particular D. W. Winnicott and his understanding of
playing in the intermediary (transitional) empirical or experiential space. In other words, playing occupies a »space and
time« of its own. The neuroscientific concept of playing is also tackled, in the connection with development as well.
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»Let my playing be my learning, and my learning be my playing«
J. C. Friedrich von Schiller (1759–1805)
Introduction
Though we all think we know what the subject-mat-
ter is when play is spoken of or listened about, it may in
fact better be described by its functions than by a formal
definition. There is no universally accepted, compre-
hensive definition of play, though the analysis of various
different historical periods confirms the well-known fact
that children engage in playing. Play is present in nu-
merous diverse cultures, regardless of the fact that its
contents may differ in individual cases. Play cuts across
the boundaries of species, so that the young of many
animals demonstrate behaviour similar to a child’s play.
However, too rigid a definition of play would destroy
its very essence, same as would too strong a handshake
murder the bird in the hand1. Play »takes hold of« our
emotional life. It possesses a creative motivation cha-
racterised by its improvisational and innovation quality,
ending in successive elaboration and refraction.
The attempts of defining play have mainly relied on
its negation, i.e. on the establishing of what play is not –
work. Play and work are often considered strong binary
antipodes, deriving from several characteristics linked
with them. Work, for instance, ensures the material basis
for life, gives life a meaning; play lacks the seriousness of
the talent for work. These opposite qualities of play and
work stay present throughout one’s whole life, though
childhood is popularly perceived as the time of play,
whilst the adulthood is understood as the time of work.
The Role of Play in Education
The first known discussions on the subject of play re-
fer to its relationship with education and date back to
Greek philosophers Plato (427–348 B.C.) and Aristotle
(384–322 B.C.). The topic of play is present in discussions
of later date as well, in particular in those written during
the early Christian era and later, in the Middle Ages.
French historian Philippe Ariès2 claims that the concept
of childhood did not exist in the Middle Ages, which
might have been the reason for the absence of the theo-
ries of play in that historical era. This author, naturally,
does not claim that children did not play in those times.
He, however, does insist on the fact that the child’s play
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was not, except in the earliest stage of life, differentiated
from the adult play before the 18th century. It was only
then the change in the family structure, improving in ed-
ucation etc., resulted in the recognition of childhood as
one of the stages of life marked by its own special fea-
tures.
English political philosopher John Locke3, though
raised in Puritan spirit (with deeply rooted Calvinist
work ethics and, as a consequence thereof, a tendency
towards preventing children from playing except when it
was related to Biblical stories, and hence serving moral
uplifting), still gave one of the earliest major contri-
butions to the modern concept of the role of play in
education. Locke3 held that the main objective of edu-
cation should be virtue. He took a stand against the use
of physical punishment as a means to motivate children
to learn. He believed that children learn better when
learning is made recreational than they do under pres-
sure, since the wish to learn is improved in this manner.
Besides having contributed to the understanding of the
important role childhood plays in the human develop-
ment, Locke3 also contributed to the appeal of the En-
lightenment movement for introducing social changes.
The most prominent among them was political philo-
sopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau4, who, in his work Émile
(1762), emphasised the theory that children undergo
various developmental stages, according to which edu-
cation should be shaped. His theory of play was mainly
based on the standpoint that play is instinctive and that
it represents the natural way of instigating physical and
emotional development. Rousseau4 did not believe that
play was wrong or that it was a waste of time; he rather
assumed that the main purpose of childhood was to make
children happy. The Romantic Movement took over Rou-
sseau’s4 emphasising that learning followed the nature
and that is was self-realisation in itself, and pointed out
diverse experiences that become available to children
during play.
After the publishing of Darwin’s5 work On the Origin
of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preser-
vation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, several
of his followers endeavoured to offer an adaptive expla-
nation of play that could apply to all species in the sense
of Darwin’s5 theory of evolution. These theories were the
first endeavours to explain play rather than merely de-
scribe it on the basis of observation.
Hence, the first true theories of play arose as late as in
the 19th century. Among the most prominent theoreti-
cians of play were German philosopher J. C. Friedrich
von Schiller (1759–1805) and – later – English philo-
sopher and sociologist Herbert Spencer (1820–1903).
They created a theory they called the energy surplus
theory in order to explain the animal play. Karl Groos6,7,
Spencer’s German contemporary, also offered a biological
explanation of play. Groos6,7 claimed that play was an
expression of the instinct necessary for the survival of a
species. Play is practice and represents the development
of competence, same as sex and fighting, used later in
life. For Groos6,7, the purpose of play is preparing for life.
He asserted that »… instead of saying, the animals play
because they are young, we should say, the animals have
a youth in order that they may play«. He further argued
that play is the means by which young mammals practice
the skills they must develop to survive into and through
adulthood.
The majority of the mentioned theoreticians of play
maintained the view that play was no serious activity,
but that it gives pleasure. Based on observations and
experiments, John Dewey8 offered a scientific approach
to learning. In his writings, he often presented the world
through binary oppositions and thus defined play as an
unconscious activity that has no reason apart from itself;
work, in contrast, is an activity that involves an interest
of some kind. In Dewey’s8 view, play represents almost a
developmental task which is subordinate to work.
Jean Piaget (1896–1980) on the Meaning
of Play
The famous Swiss developmental psychologist Jean
Piaget9 understood play as the means for accommodation
and assimilation of reality. Play and imitation constitute
an important part of Piaget’s9 theory, and they both
come under the general definition of play. He argued that
play is an almost complete assimilation, with no attempt
of adaptation to the outer reality. A child playing
»planes« with a rectangular piece of e. g. wood usually
pays no attention to a certain structural design needed
for mastering gravity or making use of air pressure. The
child simply assimilates the piece of wood into the
existing plane scheme. Contrary to this almost pure
assimilation is imitation, or a child’s serious attempt to
achieve adaptation with the outer reality. A house in the
neighbourhood caught fire during a school class. Two
days later, children were playing with cubes. Their
»house« caught fire, and children started playing the
roles of firemen and victims in the house on fire. By
simulating this situation during their play, children
made serious attempts of accommodation to the reality
they experienced two days earlier. Both assimilation and
accommodation include interactions that put a child into
relation with its environment and the child’s reality.
Giving and taking in play, as well as imitation, represent
one of the ways in which children learn about the world
surrounding them.
In play and imitations, a child learns about symbols,
or that one thing may stand in place of another. If a child
puts a hat on his/her head, s/he becomes a cowboy or a
postman. The hat is a symbol. Play itself is a symbolic
representation of the child’s personal inner world.
Piaget9 further understood play as a means for mas-
tering egocentrism. The egocentrism of a pre-school child
is characterised by the incapability to see or take the
standpoint of another person. Through repeating social
interactions, the needs, interests and goals of another in-
dividual begin to capture the child’s attention. It often
occurs in play of children of this age that two very different
egocentric standpoints collide. Thanks to this collision,
D. Rudan: On Play and Playing, 2013, Coll. Antropol. 37 (2013) 4: 1385–1391
1386
children come closer to comprehending that other people
have their own ideas, wishes and thoughts, too.
Sigmund Freud on Play
In his essay Creative Writers and Daydreaming, Freud10
sets the first traces of imaginative activity into child-
hood. Play or games are the child’s most beloved and
most intensive preoccupation.
Might we not say that every child at play behaves like
a creative writer, in that he creates a world of his own, or,
rather, rearranges the things of his world in a new way
which pleases him? It would be wrong to think he does
not take that world seriously; on the contrary, he takes
his play very seriously and he expends large amounts of
emotion on it. The opposite of play is not what is serious
but what is real. In spite of all the emotion with which he
cathects his world of play, the child distinguishes it quite
well from reality; and he likes to link his imagined
objects and situations to the tangible and visible things
of the real world. This linking is all that differentiates
the child’s »play« from »fantasying«10.
The creative writer does the same as the child at play,
said Freud10 and continued »He creates a world of fan-
tasy which he takes very seriously – that is, which he in-
vests with large amounts of emotion – while separating it
sharply from reality. Language has preserved this rela-
tionship between children’s play and poetic creation. It
gives the name of Spiel [»play«] to those forms of imagi-
native writing which require to be linked to tangible
objects and which are capable of representation. … The
unreality of the writer’s imaginative world, however, has
very important consequences for the technique of his art;
for many things which, if they were real, could give no
enjoyment, can do so in the play of fantasy, and many ex-
citements which, in themselves, are actually distressing,
can become a source of pleasure for the hearers and spec-
tators at the performance of a writer’s work«.
The deletion of the contradiction between reality and
play in the adulthood is also present in the satisfaction
offered by humour.
It appears that grow up people cease to play. »But
whoever understands the human mind knows that hardly
anything is harder for a man than to give up a pleasure
which he has once experienced. Actually, we can never
give anything up; we only exchange one thing for ano-
ther.... In the same way, the growing child, when he stops
playing, gives up nothing but the link with real objects;
instead of playing, he now fantasies. He builds castles in
the air and creates what are called daydreams«10.
People’s fantasies are less easy to observe than the
play of children10. Children do not often play in front of
the adults, but they do not hide their playing from them.
»The adult, on the contrary, is ashamed of his fantasies
and hides them from other people. He cherishes his
fantasies as his most intimate possessions, and as a rule
he would rather confess his misdeeds than tell anyone
his fantasies. This difference in the behavior of a person
who plays and a person who fantasies is accounted for by
the motives of these two activities«10.
A child’s play is determined by wishes, in fact by one
wish that also helps in the process of upbringing: it is the
child’s wish to be grown up and adult10. Children always
play as if they were adults and imitate what they know
about the life of their grown-ups. It is different with
adults: on the one hand, they are aware of the fact that
they are not continuing with playing of fantasying, but
that they are acting in the real world; on the other hand,
however, some of the wishes that result from fantasies
are of the kind that should be concealed. Hence, adults
are ashamed of their fantasies, and think of them as
childish and often not allowed10.
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle11, Freud’s psycho-
analytic theory of play is demonstrated; play is here
explicitly conceptualised as the repetition compulsion,
whereby the child wishes to constantly repeat or »re-enact«
an earlier observation, or rather an earlier experience.
Freud11 held that the leading manner in which the mind
works is the pleasure principle – minimising or discharge
of the instinctive tension resulting in pleasure. In Freud’s11
theory, the pleasure principle (of which play is an integral
part) becomes replaced by the reality principle (both
philogenetically and ontogenetically in case of an indivi-
dual child) when the child’s instincts give way to the
reason. Play follows the pleasure principle, but it also
serves – in an experimental way – the catching up of the
path to reality. Play is the form of activity of the ego that
tries to deal with the low level of anxiety emerging from
the outer pressure and the inter-systemic conflicts. Its
functions are seeking for satisfaction/pleasure and the
defensive function, and it is used in the process of the
development of sublimation. However, play is too close to
instincts to be qualified as sublimation. Nevertheless,
there are aspects of play that lead toward sublimation11.
Briefly: from the point of view of instincts, play may
be studied as a mixture of libido- and aggression-related
aspirations, the aim of which is relief, without the need
to take into account any real consequences or any
reaction of the outer world, and therefore without any
feeling of guilt caused by the reaction of the ego or the
super-ego. If we follow the developmental line from early
children’s play to group play (game) and further to work,
then we follow the line of an ever increasing acceptance
of the reality principle. As Anna Freud12 emphasised
every developmental line overlaps to a certain extent
with another, in order for a new developmental organi-
sation and reorganisation to be created. There is often a
chance to observe the overlapping of phases or co-exis-
tence of a conflict from one phase with the one from the
next phase. Thus, children may play a game, and change
the rules in accordance with their needs and wishes.
Parents may share with the child the conviction of
interconnection in the game, whilst indeed, the game has
become the child’s play. On the other hand, however, play
may share some features with game. Rules that reflect
the control of the ego and those that derive from the
demands of the super-ego have been introduced. There
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are toys, such as Lego or puzzle, which presume the child
is able to analyse reality, and thus lead the child in
towards work. This developmental line should be leading
from the pre-play phase to the play by rules (game) and
further to work13.
The Understanding of Play after Freud
Peter Neubauer14 emphasised that there were two
interconnected components: the mental act and consci-
ous and unconscious fantasies and wishes on the one
hand, and the physical act transforming them into enact-
ment that may be observed on the other. Nevertheless,
these two components still do not make the differentiat-
ing play from work possible. In the play by rules (game),
the idea or attempt to fulfil one’s wish is also trans-
formed into physical performance. Play has to have an
additional quality, which may be marked as attempting,
exploring, or trying to solve a problem in order to reach a
new level of competence or developmental organisation.
On closer inspection, even this characteristic does not
sufficiently differentiate play from work. A carpenter, an
artist, or an inventor may work very hard endeavouring
to find new solutions and experiments in action and
thought, says Neubauer14. Accordingly, the one thing
that seems self-evident should be pointed out, i.e. that an
additional necessary characteristic of play is being aware
that what is enacted is not real. An act or an action is
performed at the level of symbolic meaning; neverthe-
less, as much as it may – at times – seem similar to
reality, it still remains »play«. Let us presume a child
knows its teddy bear is not a real being; or that the tower
it builds and then destroys is not a real tower, nor is the
destruction itself real.
However, the child’s functioning at the pre-symbolic
level is no play14. The following questions arise: at which
moment during development does the child become capa-
ble of entering the world of play? At what age does the
baby become conscious of the difference between wish
and reality? Some authors suggest that a child’s early
practising of the ego apparatus serving development re-
sembles work rather than play. The peek-a-boo play
seems as the one preceding the game of hide-and-seek,
the experimenting with loss and reunification, loss and
return, accompanied by anxiety and the capability to
anticipate events14.
Play has three characteristics, according to Neubauer14:
an expression of wishes and fantasies, the enactment of
these wishes in search for fulfilment, and the conscious-
ness of its being unreal. These characteristics play a role
on the way toward reality, though it is at times difficult
to differentiate real from unreal. Many variations are
possible within the stage of translating fantasies into
enactment. Wordplay and replacing actions with words
may often result in obscuring the difference between
words and actions.
In comparison with Freud’s interpretation of play,
Winnicott15 reached a completely opposite conclusion.
According to him, play almost lacks physical excitement
based on the interference of instincts, or rather, when
this interference becomes evident, play stops, or the
enjoyment in playing is destroyed. Everything Winni-
cott15 says of a child’s playing is applicable to adults as
well; the difference lies in the fact that adult playing is
more difficult to describe since it mainly appears in the
form of verbal communication. It becomes manifested in
the choice of words, the modulation of the voice and the
sense of humour. Winnicott15 states that for him, playing
assumed a new sense when he managed to comprehend
the concept of transitional phenomena, from the early
use of a transitional object to the final stage, the ability
of a human being to experience a cultural event.
Transitioneen createdal phenomena are universal.
Winnicott15 speaks of transitional objects and transitio-
nal phenomena in the context of marking the interme-
diate area of experience: between thumb and the teddy-
bear experience; between oral erotism and a real
relationship; between the primary creative activity and
the projection of the already introjected. The transitional
object is neither an outer object nor an inner object (the
latter is a mental concept); it is a possession, the first
not-me. Winnicott15 thus introduces the third area of life
of a human being – the one marked as the intermediate
area of experience to which both the inner (psychic)
reality and the outer life contribute. This area is not
challenged, since no demands are set upon it except that
it should exist as a resting place for an individual in-
volved in the constant task of separating the still mu-
tually interconnected inner and outer reality. It stands
between the subjective and the objectively observed, bas-
ed on testing the reality.
Playing is neither inside nor outside; it is not a part of
the refused not-me world, which is perceived by an
individual as being completely outer, beyond its magical
control. In order to be able to control the outer, a person
needs to do something rather than merely think or wish;
doing however requests time. Playing is doing. In other
words, playing is set in a place and a time. The place
represents potential space or the intermediate area of ex-
perience which is created between the baby and the
mother, but only if the mother is »good enough mot-
her«11. The mother’s adaptation to the infant’s needs,
when good enough, gives the infant the illusion that
there is an reality that corresponds to the infant’s own
capacity to create. For example illusion that her breast is
infant’s creation, the part of his subjective world and un-
der his magical control. In the beginning »good enough
mother«11 will be there that she could be found (her
breast) by the infant. From the birth human being is con-
cerned with the problem of the relationship between
what is objectively perceived and what is subjectively
conceived of. Transitional phenomena represent the early
stages of the use of illusion without which there is no
meaning for the human being in the idea of a relation-
ship with an object that is perceived by others as external
to that being15. The mother’s eventual task is gradually
to disillusion the infant but she has no hope of success
unless at first she has been able to give sufficient oppor-
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tunity for illusion. It is assumed that the task of reality
acceptance is never completed, that no human being is
free from the strain of relating inner and outer reality,
and that relief from this strain is provided by an interme-
diate area of experience which is not challenged (arts, re-
ligion, etc.) This intermediate area is in direct continuity
with the play area of the small child who is »lost« in
play15.
Playing is universal and belongs to health; playing
facilitates growth and hence health; playing leads to
group relationships; it may be a form of communication;
and finally, psychoanalysis has developed as a highly
specialised form of playing with the aim of achieving
communication with oneself and the others15.
Among other functions of play in a child’s develop-
ment, the ability to play may play a significant role in the
development of a child’s mentalisation competence. The
very young child uses two forms of psychic reality, which
Target and Fonagy16 have called »psychic equivalent«
and »pretend« modes and which differ primarily in the
assumed relationship between internal and external rea-
lities In a normal course of development, the child in-
tegrates these two modes in order to reach the stage of
mentalisation or the reflective function in which mental
states may be experienced as representations. The inner
and the outer world may then be experienced as con-
nected, and accepted regardless of their differences; the
need for them to be equalised or separated (dissociate)
ceases at that point.
Fonagy and Target16 presume that mentalisation re-
gularly develops through a child’s perception that its
mental states are thought about. A prototype for this
may be found in the perception of safe games played with
the parents or an older child, which fact facilitates the
integration of two early reflective manners – the equalis-
ing and the converting – through an interpersonal pro-
cess, which may be understood as the elaboration of a
complex reflection offered to the infant by the guardian.
During playing, the guardian offers the child’s ideas and
emotions (»when it only pretends«) a connection with
reality, indicating to the existence of an alternative
perspective, which is present outside the child’s mind.
Though the parent or the older child also demonstrates
that reality may be twisted by the manner based on
playing, the child may still face a real experience through
this pretence in playing.
Safe commitment creates maximal emotional envi-
ronment, within which a child is given the opportunity to
reveal its intentional state, the capability of mentalisa-
tion or the theory of mind. To the contrary, unsafe
commitment stands in negative correlation with per-
forming tasks related to »the theory of mind« in five-year
old children17,18.
Neuroscientific Perception of Play
Neuroscientists confirm that the main shift in be-
haviour occurs at the end of the first year of infancy, and
that this developmental shift is expressed in cognitive,
motoric and affective spheres19. The observers of infant
behaviour speak of the recognition of an abrupt ma-
turing reorganisation of behaviour that occurs around
the age of 12 months20. Mahler21 describes the omni-
potent excitement and the narcissistic elation (joy) of a
young toddler, and observes that at this age, much more
than at any other during development, »narcissism is at
its peak«. The mother participates in the creation of high
levels of the positive uncontrolled emotion (affect), which
is a feature of the narcissistic state. Stern22 points out
that the harmonisation with the state of enthusiasm
promotes the wished for and healthy feelings of omni-
potence and grandiosity. Developmental psychoanalytic
researchers notice that when the love affair with the
world begins at the age of 10 to 12 months, narcissism is
at its highest peak, and that the period of exercise offers
the release into the »manic« excitement and the inclu-
sion into the world far stronger than all the previously
experienced unreliable givings …
Elation of the practicing period of the separation-indi-
viduation phase21, high levels of arousal and eleveted ac-
tivity level (boundless energy)23, are all associated with
heightened activation of the sympathetic component of
the autonomic nervous system. Also, in various animal
models it has been found, that young mammalians typi-
cally pass through a period of midinfancy in which they
display a state of organismic hyperarousal and increased
energy metabolism, especially when apart from the
mother24. This state reflect unmodulated excitatory ac-
tivity of early maturing reticular formation brain stem
systems responsible for arousal25.
It is well known that sympathetic and parasympa-
thetic components have different schedules of develop-
ment. The results of that are the unique physiological
organizations at different stages of postnatal life. As
early as 1931st famous British neurologist Hughlings
Jackson26 postulated that the infant will pass through an
excitable stage in ontogenesis that is diminished by the
later functional onset of cortical inhibitory centres. Lu-
ria27 spoke about late maturing prefrontal inhibitory
structures that hierarchically regulate early appearing
excitation. Luria27 later extended this concept by sug-
gesting that development of adaptive regulatory struc-
tures occurs postnatally and is influenced by the social
environment. Other researches in the early part of the
twenty century have shown that spontaneous emotional
expression is mainly subcortical and that cortical control
is inhibitory28. These classical models are supported by
contemporary research19. Newer studies of early develop-
ment of biogenic amine systems, the neurochemical sub-
strates of arousal, reveal an ontogenetic pattern of »in-
hibitory maturation« which counterbalances the infant’s
initial excitatory tendencies in motor activity and spon-
taneous motility29.
The view that developing capacities are adaptive to
the period in which they first emerge is completely in line
with developmental biological concept of ontogenetic adap-
tation. Schore19 propose that the affective, behavioral
and cognitive aspects unique to the practicing period of
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the separation-individuation phase21, reflect a biologi-
cally limited period of sympathetic-dominant limbic hy-
perarousal and behavioral overexcitation which have adap-
tive significance in the practicing socioenvironmental
niche«19. The same author continues: »Neo-toddler’s hy-
peractivity and high rates of positive affects that result
from the hyperarousal represent such ontogenetic adap-
tations«. Pine30 believes that the elated, constantly mov-
ing toddler who seems as someone who is filled with
boundless energy may correspond to the defintion of
infant active play. Kagan reports that at 10 months fully
90% of maternal physical and verbal behaviour consists
of affection, play, and caregiving, with only 5% involved
in prohibiting the child from ongoing activity31. Develop-
mental observers have noted that by 1 year –age stimu-
lation-seeking exploratory play time increase to as much
as 6 hours of the child day.
Some authors underscores the adaptive aspect of ear-
ly play. By altering the relationship of the young orga-
nism to its developmental environment, play in effect
makes the environment an »enriched« one19. Play be-
havior may thus reflect the phase specific heightened
activation of an exploratory-assertive motivational sys-
tem32. Tucker33 proposed the general principle: The abi-
lity to participate in processes of play and affectional
interaction may be a key determinant of both infor-
mation flow and the brain arousal that help to shape
developing networks.
In most primates, prior social isolation has a de-
vastating effect on the urge to play34. Their basic needs
for social warmth, support and affiliation must be ful-
filled first; only when confidence has been restored does
carefree playfulness return. According to Panksepp34 in
spite of that there exist substantial diversity in the
specific play patterns exhibited by different mammalian
species, the evolutionary roots probably go back to an
ancient PLAY circuitry shared by all mammalians in
essentially homologous fashion. In human research se-
veral distinct forms of play are recognized. Human play
has been divided by social and developmental psycho-
logists into exploratory/sensorimotor play, relational/
functional play, constructive play, dramatic/symbolic
play, and games- with-rules play, as well as RAT play.
This last form, rough-and-tumble play, is presently ea-
siest to study in animal models, but in human research it
has received the least attention. Although human play
has been extensively taxonomized, it is still worth con-
templating to what extent the various forms are merely
higher elaborations (culturally derived, as well as higher
neuroevolutionary variants) on a single primal theme34.
It appears that it will take time to answer the many
different questions concerning the human play.
Conclusion
Neuroscience offers an exact confirmation for a fact
that philosophers, educators, psychoanalysts, develop-
mental psychologists and many psychotherapists had
recognised long before: play stimulates the development
of cognitive and emotional abilities; and its therapeutic
value is based thereupon. D. W. Winnicott (1971) expli-
citly summarised its function and importance as follows:
»It is in playing and only in playing that the individual
child or adult is able to be creative and to use the whole
personality, and it is only in being creative that indivi-
dual discovers the self«.
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O IGRI I IGRANJU
S A @ E T A K
U radu se daje pregled razvoja koncepta igre i igranja. Teorije igre po~ele su se u pravom smislu razvijati tek od 19 st.
Igru je te{ko definirati i lak{e se njezinoj definiciji pristupa preko onoga {to ona nije, nije rad. Igra je najprije bila pove-
zivana s obrazovanjem, a tek se u Freudovoj psihoanaliti~koj teoriji i Piagetovoj razvojnoj psihologiji po~eo detaljnije
obja{njavati zna~aj igre za razvoj djeteta. Navodi se i uloga igre u odrasloj dobi. Detaljnija pa`nja posve}ena je psiho-
dinamskim, odnosno psihoanaliti~kim autorima, a naro~ito D. W. Winnicottu i njegovom shva}anju igranja u intermedi-
janom (prijelaznom) prostoru iskustva, ili do`ivljavanja. Igranje, drugim rije~ima ima svoj »prostor i vrijeme«. Tako|er
se navodi nuroznanstveno gledanje na igru, tako|er u funkciji razvoja.
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